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Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the
Behavioral Economics of Divorce
Bargaining
Tess Wilkinson-Ryant
Deborah Small tt
Introduction
Family law has become increasingly dependent on private
contracts to determine the allocation of entitlements before,
during, and after marriage. Ideally, prenuptial contracts, divorce
settlements, and child custody agreements each require the
parties involved to negotiate effectively in order to maximize the
joint welfare of the spouses, ex-spouses, and children. Evidence
suggests, however, that this contractarian ideal is not borne out by
the current reality in which women are at a financial disadvantage
to their male counterparts after divorce. Women, with or without
children, experience an average decline in standard of living of
about one-third upon divorce.' Men experience a slight increase in
standard of living because their family size decreases while they
maintain their personal income. 2
Both legal scholars and economists have posited a link
t. J.D., M.A. Psychology. Doctoral Candidate in Psychology, University of
Pennsylvania. 3720 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Email address:
twilkins@sas.upenn.edu.
tt. Assistant Professor of Marketing, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania. 700 Jon M. Huntsman Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Email
address: deborahs@wharton.upenn.edu.
1. Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences
of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988) (finding "an average change in econ@mic
status of [minus] 33 percent" for women post-divorce); see also Richard V.
Burkhauser et al., Economics of Divorce, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 353 (1991) (finding
"pretax and transfer living standards fell for the median woman by 37%" following
divorce or separation).
2. See Richard R. Peterson, A Re-evaluation of the Economic Consequences of
Divorce, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 528, 532 (1996) (finding that women experience a 27%
decline in standard of living, and men experience a 10% increase); see also Matthew
D. Bramlett & William D. Mosher, First Marriage Dissolution, Divorce, and
Remarriage: United States, in ADVANCE DATA at 2 (Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics,
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, No. 323, 2001) ("The economic
consequences of divorce can be severe for women.
For men, the retention of
income combined with decreased family size may actually result in an increase in
his new household's income per capita.").
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between negative outcomes for women and the current system of
divorce bargaining.' Legal scholars have couched this in terms of
women's preference for cooperation 4 or an "ethic of care."5 Thus,
even if private ordering is theoretically desirable, questions
remain. Are private negotiations an effective means to attain a
mutually beneficial contract? What background legal rules might
support such a regime? Why do women fare worse in these private
negotiations? This Article reviews empirical evidence suggesting
that men and women bargain differently. We hope to shed light on
the implications of current trends in family law that have
transpired in the wake of the changing status of women in
American society.
In keeping with current social-psychological research and
theory, we conceptualize gender as a cultural or situational
variable, rather than sex per se, which is a biological
categorization. 6
This approach examines the psychological
variables (i.e., low entitlement, low power, relational construal)
that underlie gender differences in bargaining. With this Article,
we hope to contribute to a broader conversation about the role of
gender research in legal theory without invoking simplistic
stereotypes about men and women. We consider both motivational
and cognitive factors that affect men's and women's bargaining
behavior, asking not only how gender affects behavior, but also
when and in what conditions gender effects are likely to emerge.
3. See Penelope Eileen Bryan, "Collaborative Divorce':· Meaningful Reform or
Another Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1001, 1002 (1999) (arguing that
divorce bargaining under conditions of power disparities, gender bias, and
indeterminate laws yields negative outcomes for women); see also Lenore J.
Weitzman, Gender Differences in Custody Bargaining in the United States, in
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 395, 404
(Lenore Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds., 1992) (arguing that bargaining over

custody agreements yields negative results for women after divorce).
4. See Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78
VA. L. REV. 421, 423-33 (1992) (arguing that women are disadvantaged at divorce
because they have a greater "taste for cooperation" than men); see also Trina Grillo,
The Mediation Alternative: Progress Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 160304 (1991) (arguing that women's propensity for cooperation makes them vulnerable
in a divorce mediation).
5. Grillo, supra note 4, at 1601; see also Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly.·
Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 488 (1992)
(noting that a wife's care orientation can interfere with her ability to negotiate
effectively with her husband); Nancy Ilman Meyers, Power (lm)Balance and the
Failure of Impartiality in Attorney-Mediated Divorce, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 853, 880
(1996) (arguing that mediation has the potential to "enhance the threat that
women's care orientation already poses for them in financial negotiations").
6. See, e.g., Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Constraints & Triggers: Situational
Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 951, 963
(2005) (finding that the effects of gender "are situationally bound").
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Men and women may differ in the kinds of goals and the levels of
engagement that they bring to a negotiation, as well as their
beliefs and mental models of the negotiating situation.
Empirical research on gender and negotiation offers insight
into the differences between men and women at the bargaining
table and the situa tiona! variables that exacerbate or eliminate
the differences. The relationship between gender and bargaining
is complicated. For instance, many studies show that women
perform poorly in negotiating tasks when gender is made salient,
i.e., when women are made more conscious of gender before the
task.' In contrast, women actually outperform men when gender
is salient and when the stereotype that women are not good
negotiators has been explicitly invoked. 8
Thus, the same
stereotype (women are not good at negotiating) elicits different
behavior depending on how it is invoked. Given the heterogeneity
of gender effects, we expect that gender effects in divorce
bargaining could vary importantly as a result of the legal context.
Following a brief review of legal scholarship on economics,
psychology, and family law (Part I), we consider three trends in
modern family law (Parts II, III, and IV), and discuss research on
the psychology of gender and negotiation that relate to each trend.
While there are a number of different potential bargaining
situations, we focus here on divorce settlement agreements,
though it is clear that many of the issues raised in that context
would apply to prenuptial agreements or custody arrangements.
The first trend we review is the increasing preference for private,
face-to-face negotiations rather than judge-made settlements. We
review literature suggesting that women and men may bring
different goals to the bargaining table, which may produce
different behavior and outcomes for men and women in these
negotiations. The second trend is that modern family laws are
often quite vague, using standards like "equitable distribution" 9
and "best interest of the child." 10 Since gender differences are
typically larger when situations are ambiguous, indetermip.ate

7. See Laura J. Kray et al., Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype Confirmation
and Reactance in Negotiations, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 942, 946 (2001)
(offering empirical results to support the theory of stereotype threat by
demonstrating that implicitly making a negotiation task "with gender-linked
expectations ... diagnostic of ability" negatively affected the performance of women
in that negotiation).
8. See, e.g., id. at 955 (showing that women performed better when the
stereotype was explicitly activated while men's performance suffered).
9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 61.075 (West 2002).
10. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 30-3-150 (1996).
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legal standards may provide a context where gender is most likely
to matter. Finally, we discuss the trend toward complete financial
separation at the time of divorce, which decreases the possibility of
alimony. 11 Research indicates that women are more comfortable
asking for things than negotiating for things.12 Alimony involves
transfers from one party to another, whereas a financial
settlement involves a division of resources between two parties;
the former seems like more of an ask situation and the latter more
of a negotiate situation.
Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein have recently suggested
that the utility of behavioral law and economics is that
psychological research can both highlight instances of limited
rationality and suggest frames or approaches to help reduce
reasoning errors. 13 In the final Part, we make some preliminary
suggestions for new directions in legal scholarship and empirical
research.
I.

Legal Scholarship on Economics, Psychology, & Family
Law

The law and economics movement has changed the way that
legal scholars think about family law.1 4 Drawing on the work of
University of Chicago economist Gary Becker, legal theorists have
conceptualized the decision to marry as essentially a consumer
decision, one that involves a comparison of the costs and benefits
of marriage versus single life. IS Similarly, divorce is also a kind of
good, chosen if it offers an increase in welfare. 16 Once marriage is
couched in the language of the market, it is easier to see the
appeal of contract-based family law, offering individuals the
chance to optimize their personal and joint welfare by designing
exactly the kind of relationship that they find most beneficia].17

11. Many states refer to alimony as "spousal maintenance." See, e.g., MINN.
STAT.§ 518.552 (2003).
12. See LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T AsK 3 (2003).
13. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. !99, 200 (2005).
14. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 517-29 (2001) (summarizing legal scholarly
thinking on economics and divorce).
15. See Richard A. Posner, Gary Becker's Contributions to Law and Economics,
22 J. LEGAL STUD. 211, 213 (1993) (summarizing Becker's argument for the
application of economic principles to marriage and divorce law).
16. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decision-Making About Marriage and
Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 44-45 (1990).
17. See Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size Fits All to
Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV.1479, 152()-26 (2001).
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This is, of course, a fairly controversial shift. IS Traditionally,
marriage and divorce were regarded as moral commitments, and
breach of the marriage contract, most notably adultery, was
i!legaJ.l9 The law and economics approach to marriage takes
individual liberty and the maximization of welfare as its
normative basis rather than religious or moral dictates about
marriage as a lifetime commitment. 2o
This Article mainly considers a less controversial application
of economic theory to family law because we are interested in
contracts allocating property after divorce. Most state divorce
laws rely to some extent on a conceptualization of the marriage
agreement as a personal contract; 21 laws governing separation of
property at divorce no longer specify financial penalties for the atfault party,'' and spousal support is on the decline. 23 Tradition
may view with skepticism a system that conceives of marriage and
divorce as goods, but a divorce settlement is in fact about assets,

18. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and Law: No Fault Divorce
and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503, 555~81 (1994) (discussing the
negative costs of removing morality from the marriage/divorce discourse).
19. See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract,
84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1295--96 ("The understanding that adultery, physical and
mental cruelty, and desertion are unacceptable spousal behavior was captured
under traditional law in fault grounds for divorce which gave a right to terminate
the marriage to the 'innocent and injured' spouse."). Twenty-three states still have
laws against adultery. See ALA. CODE§ 13A.13·2 (2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-1408 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-501 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (West
2007); GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-6-19 (2003); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 18-6601 (2004); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West 2002); !CAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (2006); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (LexisNexis 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 750.30 (West
2004); MINN. STAT.§ 609.36 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2003); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (LexisNexis 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 255.17 (McKinney 2000);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-20-09 (1997); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 872 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-15-60 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365
(2004); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (LexisNexis 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.16
(West 2005).
20. See Lloyd R. Cohen, Marriage: The Long-Term Contract, in LA-w; AND
ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 10, 12 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert
Rowthorn eds., 2002) ("Marriage, despite being the culmination of romantic love,
can be fruitfully analyzed employing the tools of rational choice.").
21. See, e.g., Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. 1998)
(''Marriage ... is a civil contract.").
22. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT§ 307, 9A U.L.A 288-89 (1998) (providing
that property division should be determined "without regard to marital
misconduct").
23. See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New
York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621,
697-724 (1991) (citing statistics showing that alimony awards are less frequent, for
less money, and less often permanent since the adoption of New York's equitable
distribution law).
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earning capacity, and other things easily understood as part of an
economic transaction. We do not make any fundamental challenge
to the notion of economic efficiency in divorce bargaining as an
appropriate normative goal. Rather, our intention in this Article
is to address human behavior in divorce negotiations. Specifically,
we review the empirical literature on negotiation, with an eye
toward how differences in bargaining behavior between men and
women might systematically affect the success of private divorce
agreements given the dominant principles of modern family law.
There are strong efficiency arguments supporting the modern
divdrce regime. For example, the parties may be in a much better
position than the judge to determine how best to divide their
property to maximize the total utility of the distribution. Though
a couple's two cars may be of equal value, the husband may prefer
one and the wife the other; individual or idiosyncratic preferences
are best determined by the parties rather than by an assessment
of market value, which is used by judges. It is important to note
that there is considerable counterevidence to suggest that divorce
negotiations are not particularly efficient. 24 In fact, it has been
the role of behavioral economics to document many of the common
heuristics and biases that impede efficient negotiating, including
self-serving biases, 2 ·5 the fixed-pie bias,26 and the endowment
effect. 27
When talking about divorce bargaining in this Article,
though, we are always referring to a gendered negotiation in the
sense that a divorcing couple has historically been comprised of
one woman and one man. 28 Given this fact, it is important to also
24. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 534 (showing a 27% decline in women's
standard of living after negotiated divorce settlements).
25. See Linda Thompson & George Lowenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of
Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 0RG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 176 (1992) (describing experiments in which subjects' assessments
of fairness are consistently in line with their own self-interest).
26. See Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, Heuristics in Negotiation:
Limitations to Effective Dispute Resolution, in NEGOTIATING IN ORGANIZATIONS 51,
62-63 (Max H. Bazerman & Roy J. Lewicki eds., 1983) (reviewing evidence that
negotiating parties overlook opportunities for joint gain, instead focusing on a
"fixed pie of resources" where one side's gain is the other's loss).
27. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 211, 211 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000) (showing empirical evidence that entitlements affect parties'
valuation of a good).
28. This has begun to change as same·sex marriages and civil unions grow
more popular. The Massachusetts divorce statute applies to the dissolution of
same·sex marriages.
See Salucco v. Alldredge, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 498, No.
02E0087GC1, 2004 WL 864459, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2004) ("Opposite·
sex couples who marry are afforded the opportunity to extinguish their legal
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consider psychological variables associated with gender.
II. Law: Private Bargaining, Not Judge-Made Settlement
Modern divorce law favors private negotiations to determine
the allocation of assets after divorce.29 Couples can, for example,
draft a contract individually, as a couple, or with their lawyers. 30
Couples who are unable to reach an agreement with their lawyers
alone may be ordered by the court to go through mediation before
the judge will hear the case. 31
The next Section considers four areas of psychological
research showing systematic gender differences in bargaining
behavior that are likely to be manifest in such private settlements:
communal goals, impression management, stereotype threat, and
power dynamics.
A.

Communal Goals

In bargaining research, two general kinds of goals have been
identified: "task-specific goals" and "interaction goals."32 Taskspecific goals are normally tangible goals that negotiators set for
themselves, including getting a good deal, obtaining the desired
goods, and perhaps minimizing transaction costs. 33 Interaction
goals reflect the interpersonal dimension of negotiations. 34
Considerable research suggests that women, more than men, place
a great weight on interpersonal goals in negotiation relative to
task-specific goals, and that women are more attuned to the
relational component of a negotiation. 35 They are more likely than
relationship through the mechanism of divorce. Reasoning follows there from that
same-sex couples who enter into legal relationships should also be allowed to
dissolve their legal relationships.").
In states that recognize civil unions,
dissolution proceedings for same-sex civil unions may be very similar to divorce.
See William C. Duncan, Survey of Interstate Recognition of Quasi-Marital Statuses,
3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 617, 622-23 (noting that a Massachusetts court decision
treated a Vermont civil union dissolution substantially the same as marital
dissolution).
29. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
30. See id. at 952-56 (discussing private ordering in divorce).
31. Jessica Pearson, Family Mediation, in NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT·
CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH 51, 55 (Susan Keilitz ed., 1994).
32. Laura Kray & Linda Babcock, Gender in Negotiations: A Motivated Social
Cognitive Analysis, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 203, 205----09 (Leigh L.
Thompson ed., 2006).
33. !d.
34. !d.
35. Deborah M. Kolb & Gloria C. Coolidge, Her Place at the Table: A
Consideration of Gender Issues in Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND
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men to report concern for an opponent's feelings, and they are
motivated to maintain a good relationship during negotiations, 36
This stems from the general finding that women are more
communally-oriented than men 37 and that their self-concept is
more dependent on their relationships with others, 38 which may in
turn make them focus more on interpersonal goals and less on
task -specific goals.
It is possible that this general gendered pattern is less
applicable to the divorce context because motives to maintain a
good relationship or to attend positively to the opponent's feelings
maY be less evident, even for women, when a relationship is being
terminated. 3 9
Conversely, there are reasons to suspect that
gender differences will persist in this context. In many cases the
relationship is not completely terminated; the divorce may be
amicable or the couple may have children for whom it is important
to remain on good terms. 40
It may appear foolish for women to have these goals at the
expense of maximizing their financial welfare, but relat~onal goals
make good sense if both parties have them because cooperation
typically increases joint gain. 41 The situation is much like the
famous prisoners' dilemma in which two interrogated players must
choose independently whether to cooperate by agreeing to say
nothing or defect by betraying the other. 42 If they both cooperate,
PRACTICE 261, 264 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1991).
36. Wesley C. King, Jr. & Thomas D. Hinson, The Influence of Sex and Equity
Sensitivity on Relationship Preferences, Assessment of Opponent, and Outcomes in a
Negotiation Experiment, 20 J. MGMT. 605, 611 (1994).
37. See Susan E. Cross & Laura Madson, Models of the Self" Sel{-Construals
and Gender, 122 PSYCHOL. BULL. 5, 5 (1997).
38. See, e.g., Serge Guimond et al., Social Comparison, Self-Stereotyping, and
Gender Differences in Self-Construals, 90 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 221,
221 (2006) (finding that "women define themselves higher in relational
interdependence than men").
39. See Anne·Marie Am bert, Relationships Between Ex-Spouses: Individual and
Dyadic Perspectives, 5 J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 327, 343 (1988) (describing
an experiment in which divorced men and women expressed no interest in
relationship repair).
40. See Elizabeth E. Graham, Turning Points and Commitment in Post-Divorce
Relationships, 64 CoMM. MONOGRAPHS 350, 361 (1997). For an example of what
might happen if a divorced couple does not act amicably, see Colin Camerer &
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. ECON.
PERSP. 209, 212 (1995), which describes "ultimatum game" experiments in which
subjects reject a monetary award in order to deprive an unfair player from a
reward.
41. See JAMES N. WEBB, GAM:E THEORY: DECISIONS, INTERACTIONS AND
REVOLUTION 62-63 (2007) (describing the optimal solution of the prisoners'
dilemma).
42. !d.
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they each receive a short prison sentence. 4 ' If they both defect,
they each receive a medium prison sentence. 44 If, however, one
cooperates and the other defects, the cooperatcr receives a very
long sentence and the defector gets off scot-free. 45
Divorce
settlements similarly benefit from cooperation. In the "divorcee's
dilemma," if one party acts selfishly and the other cooperates, then
the cooperator fares worse than if that person had also acted
selfishly. 46 Hypothetically, if a woman cooperates (i.e., tries to
maintain a positive relationship at the expense of maximizing
financial gains) and a man defects (i.e., tries exclusively tc
maximize financial gains), then the woman ends up poorer for it.

B.

Impression Management

A somewhat different type of interpersonal goal is impression
management. Impression management is the straightforward
concept that people's behavior is affected by how they want others
to perceive them.47 In general, people want others to judge them
favorably, 48 meaning that behavior is affected by others'
expectations. Since different expectations exist for men's and
women's behavior, 4 9 such expectations may contribute to divergent
behaviors. Women are typically expected to play nice and to not
be aggressive, 50 whereas expectations for men are quite the
opposite."' Studies show, for example, that women's competitive
behavior differs as a function of who is watching; women behave
less competitively when they are in public than when they are in
privateJi2 Furthermore, women's personal entitlement or self~
evaluation is also greater in private than in public. In one study,
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Andrew DuBrin, Sex Differences in the Use and Effectiveness of
Tactics of Impression Management, 74 PSYCHOL. REP. 531 (1994) (discussing
different impression-management strategies and comparing men's and women's
uses and perceptions of these strategies).
48. See, e.g., id. at 532 (describing the different impression-management
strategies used to create favorable impressions in others).
49. See, e.g., Laurie Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The
Costs and Benefits of Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 629 (1998) (describing the different ways men and
women have been socialized to act).
50. See, e.g., id. at 630 (explaining that women are expected to be more
"community oriented'').
51. See, e.g., id. at 629 (explaining that men are expected to be more aggressive
in order to compete for economic resources and attention from women).
52. E.g., id. at 630.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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experimenters offered participants a fixed amount of money and
told them to work on a task until they believed they had earned
the money.' 3 Women worked longer on the task when they
believed that they were being monitored than when they were
being unmonitored. 54 Men, on the other hand, worked the same
amount in each condition. 55
As mentioned in the previous Section, women care more
about other goals beyond maximizing their share of assets.
Relational goals can be functional for both parties in negotiation, 56
but there are strategic reasons why women in particular should
bargain in a more cooperative manner given the social
environment they inhabit. Research indicates that women who
negotiate aggressively or behave in a self-interested manner suffer
adverse consequences. 57 Discrimination plays an important role
in reinforcing gender norms of bargaining behavior. Sex roles are
stereotyped.
Words typically used to describe women in
negotiation include "childlike," "eager to soothe hurt feelings," and
"gullible."58
For men, typical descriptors are "aggressive,"
Not only are these traits
"competitive," and "forceful."59
descriptive, but they are also prescriptive, which is to say that
society thinks that women are sensitive and also that a woman
should be sensitive. 60 Laurie Rudman and Peter Glick have found
that agentic women-meaning those displaying self-interested and
autonomous traits-are rated as less socially skilled and likeable
than identically presented men. 61 A subset of agentic traits
related to social dominance elicit negative responses when a

53. Brenda Major et al., Overworked and Underpaid: On the Nature of Gender
Differences in Personal Entitlement, 47 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1399,
1405-10 (1984).
54. Id. at 1409.
55. ld. Interestingly, in both conditions, women worked longer than men. Id.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 41--46.
57. See Madeline E. Heilman et al., Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women
Who Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 416 (2004)
(describing experiments where women were disliked after displaying aggressive
behavior, which led to detrimental effects in work settings).
58. Sandra Bern, The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny, 42 J. CLINICAL
& CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 155, 156 tbl. 1 (1974).
59. Id.
60. Deborah Prentice & Erica Carranza, What Women and Men Should Be,
Shouldn't Be, Are Allowed to Be, and Don't Have to Be: The Contents of Prescriptive
Stereotypes, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 269 (2002); see also Bern, supra note 58, at
156----61 (explaining an experiment in which stereotypical female traits were
considered more socially desirable when associated with women).
61. Laurie A Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743, 757 (2001).
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woman expresses them, •2 but women can avoid being judged
negatively by showing community-oriented behavior. 63 Other
researchers have found that women who succeed in a male arena
are penalized; they are rated as less likeable.•• For a man,
likeability may not actually be important m terms of
advancement, 65 but this is not true for women. Research has
shown that when a woman is disliked, she elicits negative
evaluations and lower reward allocations. 66
Negotiation, as we have discussed, is a masculine-typed
task. 67 Thus, female negotiators face a double-bind: aggressive
negotiations may be punished with a lower reward allocation, but
weak negotiation strategy is also likely to yield a low reward.
C.

Stereotype Threat

There is also an important cognitive response to face-to-face
bargaining in which gender is a salient dimension. A robust
finding in social psychology termed "stereotype threat" documents
that the salience of a negative stereotype about one's group
hinders performance on tasks relevant to the stereotype. 68 As an
illustration, one famous study showed that Asian girls performed
better than baseline on a math test if ethnicity was salient (they
answered questions about ethnicity right before the test) and
worse than usual if gender was salient. 69 In other words, their
performance conformed to the more salient stereotype: Asians are
good at math, but girls are not. 70

62. Id. at 758.
63. ]d.
64. Heilman et al., supra note 57, at 420 ("[W]hen success was made explicit,
there was a differentiation between women and men ... with women deemed to be
far less likable and more interpersonally hostile.").
65. See Janet M. Stoppard & Rudolf Kalin, Gender Typing and Social
Desirability of Personality in Person Evaluation, 7 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 209, 216
(1983) (noting that even though women were judged to be more likable, men Were
rated as doing better). But see Heilman et al., supra note 57, at 425 ("The fact that
an unlikable individual is not viewed to be as worthy of salary increases or
promotions ... ':;as found to be true regardless of whether the individual is a man
or a woman .... ).
66. Heilman et al., supra note 57, at 426.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 35--38.
68. Nalini Ambody et al, Stereotype Susceptibility in Children: Effects of
Identity Activation on Quantitative Performance, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 385, 388 (2001)
("[B}oth positive and negative self-relevant stereotypes are insidious and can affect
the performance of even very young children.").
69. Id. at 387.
70. Id.

Law and Inequality

120

[Vol. 26:109

Stereotype threat, also called stereotype confirmation, 71 is
another mechanism by which gendered expectations and
stereotypes affect women's bargaining behavior. 72 The stereotype
about women and negotiation is that women are less comfortable
and less effective than men in negotiation. 73 Laura Kray, Leigh
Thompson, and Adam Galinsky asked fifty Master's in Business
Administration (''MBA") students to write an essay about whether
men or women have the advantage in negotiation.7 4
More
participants said that men would have the advantage, invoking
traditional gender stereotypes like men's assertiveness and
strength. 75 Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky found that men were
more successful than women when stereotypes were subtly or
implicitly activated. 76 One method of implicit activation is simply
the presence of a member of the opposite sex; 77 the authors found
that in mixed-gender dyads, gender is more salient and stereotype
threat is more likely to occur. 78 The authors argue that when
stereotypes are implicitly activated, people are more likely to
make judgments or otherwise act in ways consistent with the
stereotype. 79 Divorce bargains, by definition, always involve
mixed-gender dyads, so gender norm expectations are likely to be
activated.

D. Power
Women typically hold less power in society and in marital
relationships than men. so Power has shown to be a critical

71. Kray et al., supra note 7, at 954-55.
72. See id. at 946 (discussing an experiment in which the mere mention of
negotiation skills as necessary in order for success and career advancement caused
women to perform worse in negotiations).
73. !d. at 943.
74. ld. at 944.
75. !d.
76. !d. at 955.
77. ld. at 946.
78. !d. at 948 (finding that stereotype activation had a greater effect on
performance in mixed-gender negotiating dyads).
79. See id. at 955 (finding that activating implicit stereotypes positively
impacted men's performance in negotiations, but had little effect on women).
Interestingly, this effect does not hold true for explicit activations, which actually
decrease the effects of negative stereotypes about women. !d.; see also infra Part

N.
80. See Nancy M. Henley & Marianne LaFrance, Gender as Culture: Difference
and Dominance in Nonverbal Behavior, in NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR: PERSPECTIVES,
APPLICATIONS, INTERCULTURAL INSIGHTS 351, 361-65 (Aaron Wolfgang ed., 1984)
(discussing different nonverbal behaviors among men and women and arguing that
the difference relates more to power than gender).
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variable in negotiation. 81 First, power affects the use of language.
In a seminal doctrine about social language, Penelope Brown and
Steven Levinson argue that politeness was intricately linked with
social power.B2 Low-power individuals are more inclined to use
polite speech (such as carefully worded requests rather than direct
demands) in order to avoid imposing on others, given their lack of
status to do so. 83 They are less prone to criticize, disagree, or
attempt to get something from another person. 8 4 Accordingly,
women who lack power are intimidated by what is perceived as
competitive or aggressive behavior in negotiations, 85 and they tend
instead to use weaker, but more polite, strategies of
communication. 86
Second, power is associated with perceived freedom, control,
and influence. 87 That association leads individuals to seek out
resotrrces and to take action in competitive situations. 88 In
experiments, individuals who are given power are more likely to
negotiate. 89 Therefore, women's lack of power may inhibit them
from taking any action at all.
III. Divorce Law: Indeterminacy
Another critical feature of the modern divorce law is
indeterminacy, which exists on two levels. First, the law itselfthat which governs a judge's decision-making-permits enormous
discretion on the part of the court.'o The section on Disposition of
81. See Joe C. Magee et al., Power, Propensity to Negotiate, and Moving First in
Competitive Interactions, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 200, 209 (2007)
("[P]ower affects the initiation of negotiation and the making of first offers, as well
as a positive effect of moving first on objective outcomes.").
82. PENELOPE BROWN & STEVEN C. LEVINSON, POLITENESS: SOME UNIVERSALS
IN LANGUAGE USAGE 59-60 (1987).
83. David A. Morand, Language and Power: An Empirical Analysis of
Linguistic Strategies Used in Superior-Subordinate Communication, 21 J. ORG.
BEHAV. 235, 238 (2000).

84. See id. ("Verbal hedges ... enable speakers to avoid committing themselves
to the intent of their own speech act .... ").
85. See BABCOCK & LA..'!CHEVER, supra note 12, at 113-14 (2003) (describing a
web survey in which women expressed great anxiety about negotiating).
86. See supra text accompanying note 83.
87. See Dacher Keltner et al., Power, Approach, and Inhibition, 110 PSYCHOL.
REV. 265, 279 (2003); see also David Kipnis, Does Power Corrupt?, 24 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 33, 39 (1972) ("[P]ower increases the likelihood that
the individual will attempt to influence and manipulate others.").
88. Adam Galinsky et al., From Power to Action, 85 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 453, 462 (2003) ("[T]he possession and experience of power leads directly
to the taking of action.").
89. Magee et al., supra note 81, at 208.
90. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCF. ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 288 (2007)
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Property in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA'') asks
the court to "equitably apportion" property between the spouses by
taking into account several factors, many of which are broad and
undefined. 91 These include the liabilities and needs of each of the
parties, the contributions of each party to the joint assets, and the
contribution of a spouse "as a homemaker or to the family unit."9 2
Clearly, the law is intended to be a guide rather than a strict rule.
In fact, courts often consider a case in its entirety rather than
factor by factor. 93 At least one legal commentator has noted that
outcomes in court have varied more and more under the new law;
they have been both less predictable and more difficult to
achieve. 94
The second layer of indeterminacy is caused by the common
practice of determining divorce outcomes through private
negotiation between the parties. 95 As such, the distribution that
would result from a judge-made agreement is useful as a point of
comparison, or as the threat-point. 96 In other words, the more
that parties know about how a judge would allocate their property,
the more clearly the bounds of the negotiation are set. 97 Rational
parties would not agree to a distribution in which they receive less
than they would get from a judge (minus the cost of litigation)-"8
"[B]argaining in the shadow of the law"'' presents various
problems from a decision-making perspective. Parties need to
predict not only how the other will respond to each proposal, but
also how a judge would decide the case. Even when the law is
clear, there is evidence to suggest that biased decision-making

(discussing the ways in which courts may apportion property).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Lightburn v. Lightburn, No. 2445-97-2, 1998 WL 169499, at *1
(Va. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1998); Thomas v. Thomas, No. 1619-95-4, 1996 WL 679985,
at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1996); Masri v. Masri, 48 Va. Cir. 5 (Cir. Ct. 1999).
94. Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 739
(1991). For example, the proceedings require longer durations before decisions are
made. ld. at 651 (stating that the average case duration in New York has
increased from 1.3 years to 1.5 years).
95. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 951 ("[TJhe overwhelming
majority of divorcing couples resolve distributional questions ... without bringing
any contested issue to court for adjudication.").
96. See id. at 968 (discussing the role of background legal rules as a baseline for
private divorce negotiations).
97. Id. at 968.
98. Id. at 968--69.
99. Id. at 969, 997.
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hinders the efficiency of bargaining with the law as a backdropJOO
In this Section, we review four relevant phenomena-situational
ambiguity, risk aversion, personal entitlement, and anchoring-for
evidence of that bias.

Situational Ambiguity
The first issue-ambiguity-is indeterminacy itself.
In
empirical studies, ambiguous negotiating terms have resulted in
better outcomes for men than women.1o1 Certain situations are
highly structured with clear demands, limitations, and
expectations about appropriate behavior; others are more
ambiguous,
with
the
appropriate
response
unclear.wz
Psychologists refer to these two general categories of situations as
strong versus weak situations. 10 3 A number of studies indicate
that gender differences and other individual differences decrease
in stronger situations, assuming the appropriate response is not
gendered_l0 4 In one study, John Dovidio and colleagues videotaped
men and women in mixed-sex pairs discussing a gender-neutral
topic and found that men were more verbally dominant than
women were. 105 However, when the experimenters manipulated
social expectations, thereby strengthening the situations,
participants of both sexes behaved in conformity to the salient
expectation. lOB Other researchers have found that the gender gap
in pay expectations decreases with explicit performance
feedback. 107
A.

100. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, The Effects of Marital
Misconduct on No-Fault Divorce Bargaining, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming Jan.
2008) (finding that subjects tend to disfavor marital wrong-doers in divorce
negotiations, even under clear instructions about the no-fault law); see also Linda
Babcock & Geoge Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of SelfServing Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 114-15 (1997) (finding that people
analyzing legal materials find arguments supporting their own preferred outcome
to be more important and convincing).
101. See, e.g., Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Constraints and Triggers: Situational
Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 951", 957
(2005) ("Under high ambiguity, ... male buyers walked out of the negotiation
paying 27% less than did female buyers.").
102. I d. at 952.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., id. at 962 ("[G)ender effects on negotiation performance were
significantly greater under conditions of high [weak situations) as compared with
low structural ambiguity [strong situations).").
105. John Dovidio et al., Power Displays Between Men and Women in
Discussions of Gender.Linked Tasks: A Multichannel Study, 55 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 580, 583 (1988).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Wayne H. Bylsma & Brenda Major, Two Routes to Eliminating
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Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock, and Katherine
McGinn have recently demonstrated that gender differences
emerge when ambiguity is present in negotiations.1os In one
empirical demonstration, the researchers surveyed graduating
MBA students, asking for information about each student's
starting salary and industry.l09 The team compared gender
differences in starting salaries in industries for which MBA
students had vague salary expectations (i.e., telecommunications
and health care/human services), as compared to industries for
which most students had clear information and expectations (i.e.,
investment banking and consulting).11o They found that the
gender wage gap was more than twice as high for the highambiguity industries.' 11 Although this study cannot alone prove
that gender differences in negotiation in the "ambiguous" salary
industries cause the gender wage gap, it is certainly consistent
with the hypothesis.
Experimental results have also demonstrated a causal effect
between ambiguity and gender differences in negotiation. In one
experiment, participants were given a negotiating scenario and
asked to play the roles of the negotiators, with a monetary reward
as a function of the outcome of the negotiation.' 12 In the lowambiguity condition, participants had a limit as well as a target
price, whereas in the high-ambiguity condition, participants had
only a limit, but no target price.' 13 Thus, the experiment explicitly
manipulated the situational ambiguity through the parties' target
and reserve prices. 114 In the high-ambiguity condition, male
buyers came out of the negotiation paying 27% less than female
buyers; however, in the low-ambiguity condition, there were no
significant sex differences. 11 5 The implications of this research for
divorce bargaining and divorce policy are clear: the indeterminacy
of the current law may put women at a disadvantage by making it
unclear exactly what they should be trying to achieve in the
divorce negotiations.
As long as women fulfill the gender
Gender Differences in Personal Entitlement: Social Comparisons and Performance
Evaluations, 16 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 193, 193 (1992) (finding that absent feedback
or wage comparison information, women felt they deserved less pay than men, but
with feedback, women felt they deserved as much pay as the men).
108. Bowles et al., supra note 101, at 951.
109. ld. at 954.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 955--56.
112. Id. at 956.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 957.
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expectation by asking for and receiving less than men, ambiguous
cues are likely to elicit behaviors in congruence with those norms.
The result of the modern, multi-factor law is thus in stark contrast
with its purpose, which was to make the notions of ownership and
contribution more flexible in order to move away from a regime in
which the male breadwinner was entitled to all of the property in
his name or purchased with his income.116

B.

Risk Aversion

Indeterminacy may also interact with different preferences
for risk. Bargaining aggressively under a vague standard is a
riskier tactic: it is not clear what distribution will result if the
other party decides to take the case to the judge, and the litigation
costs alone are often quite high. 117 As such, it may be possible for
the more risk-averse party to be pressured into a lower settlement,
as long as litigation does not necessarily guarantee a better
outcome. Indeed, evidence suggests that women tend to perceive
greater risk for most negative outcomes, have higher levels of fear
and worry, and behave more cautiously.ns

C.

Judgment Calls: Personal Entitlement

The very nature of indeterminacy requires the divorce parties
to make judgment calls about how much they are entitled to in the
settlement and how much they need to Jive on. There are two
reasons why we might expect women to make lower estimates of
both of these: differential entitlement and differential anchoring.
Women and men differ on measures of personal entitlement,
especially when information is limited 119-as it is in divorce.
Because the law includes so many factors and because the
standard appears so subjective, it may be quite difficult for either
party to determine how much of the marital estate he or she
deserves. Brenda Major and colleagues asked male and female

l 16. See Mary A Throne, Pension Awards in Divorce and Bankruptcy, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 194, 195--97 (noting that one of the most important drivers of
modern divorce reform, including the trend toward equitable distribution, is to
ratify the partnership view of marriage, a view not supported by the common-law
title regime of marital property).
117. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 971-72.
118. See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 12, at 135, 138 (noting that "women
... see the world as more dangerous" than men and that "women's fear of taking
social risks prompts them to behave more cautiously than men").
119. See Major et al., supra note 53, at 1410 ("[S]ex differences in self-pay do not
occur when information about the pay of other men and women is readily
available.").
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college students to pay themselves (out of the view of other
experimenters) after performing a task, and they also asked
another group to do as much work as they thought fair for a fixed
amount of money.' 2 0 Women paid themselves less and worked
longer than men, although their work was more efficient and more
accurate than that of the male participants. 121 In one variant on
this experiment, Major and her colleagues left participants a list of
the amounts that (bogus} previous participants paid themselves.'22
In this trial, when participants had pay information, men and
women did not differ on self·pay123
Lisa Barron has identified two methods by which people
might determine how much they should be paid. 124 In her study,
most men said that their salary should be determined by their
worth, i.e., skills, capacities, and experiences. 12 5 Women, on the
other hand, were more likely to indicate that their worth as
employees was determined by how much the organization was
willing to pay.' 26
The aforementioned research on gender and entitlement has
primarily been discussed in reference to the gender wage gap. It
need not be so limited; this could be an important difference in the
divorce context when parties are determining entitlements in the
settlement. Barron's research suggests that men would be likely
to ask the questions: "What did I contribute? What do I
deserve?" 127 For women, the questions-impossible to answer
with specificity-are: "What do the rules say that I should get?
What does the legal system establish as my entitlement?" 128 As
Barron notes in her study of pay entitlement, self·determined
worth is almost always higher than externally·derived worth.129
As a result, we would expect that men would generally feel
entitled to more of the resource pool than would women. 130
120. See id. at 1401, 1405-06.

121. Id. at 1409.
122. Id. at 1402.

123. !d. at 1404.
124. Lisa Barron, Ask and You Shall Receive?: Gender Differences in Negotiators'
Beliefs About Requests for a Higher Salary, 56 HUM. REL. 635 (2003).
125. I d. at 647, 654.
126. Id. at 646 ("[T]hese negotiators regard the organization as the final arbiter
of their value.").
127. See id. at 647, 654.
128. See id. at 646, 654.
129. Id. at 651 (noting that those who know their worth request higher salaries
than those who are unsure of their worth and thus use external factors to
determine their worth).
130. To be sure, men make more financial contributions to most marriages,
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D. Judgment Calls: Anchoring
A related problem in negotiating in an indeterminate setting
is the problem of "anchoring," a robust source of judgment bias
discussed in psychology literature. 131 The idea of the anchoring
effect is that when people make a judgment-say, estimate the
value of something-they look for other relevant judgments to aid
in their decision-making. 132 So, if you are trying to judge how
much a used car is worth, one number you might take into account
is the asking price. Knowing that the asking price will probably be
inflated, you adjust your own estimate downward to come up with
a number as a counteroffer. This seems fairly reasonable, but
anchoring studies show that people rarely adjust adequately from
the anchor. 133 Even irrelevant anchors (demonstrated through
random number generators in experiments) have an impact on
negotiation outcomes. 134 Thus, counteroffers and final outcomes of
negotiations are highly affected by starting offers which act as
anchors for the opposing party,l35
In the divorce context, this raises the concern that women
who need to evaluate both their contributions to the marital assets
and their needs post-divorce will anchor to lower figures than will
men. Tn fact, research has .shown that women's wage satisfaction
is determined by their relative success compared to other women
rather than to men, even if they have information about the wages
of both sexes, since the female wage anchor is more salient and
relevant to them. 136 Another possibility is that women will focus
on their own earning power, either on their wages from a time
whereas women tend to be responsible for non-market labor, which is more difficult
to cast in monetary terms. See generally id. at 652 ("[R]esearchers have speculated
that men and women traditionally have achieved their worth from different sources
with men deriving worth from the market and women from the home.").
131. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty,
185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974) (describing anchoring as "mak[ing] estimates by starting
from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer").
132. Id.
133. !d. (noting that anchoring "adjustments are typically insufficient").
134. Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of
Irrelevant Anchors on Experts' Judicial Decision-Making, 32 PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 198 (finding that judges' sentencing decisions "were
influenced by random numbers even if [the judges] determined these numbers
themselves by throwing dice").
135. Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role
of Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
657, 657 (2001) ("[W]hichever party
made the 1st offer obtained a better
outcome. In addition, 1st offers were a strong predictor of final settlement prices.").
136. Wayne H. Bylsma & Brenda Major, Social Comparisons and Contentment:
Exploring the Psyclwlogical Costs of the Gender Wage Gap, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q.
241, 247 (1994).

128

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 26:109

when they worked at full earning capacity or on their current
salary. Married women earn much less than married men. In
2004, the average income for married males was almost $58,000;
for married women, it was less than $30,000,137 Other research
indicates that when these factors are salient, women take them
into account when determining appropriate pay for a new job or
task.1 38 Note that it is likely that these factors are important for
men as well. As a descriptive matter, however, anchors to current
salary or even to friends' salaries will be more informative for men
because married men and their friends are more likely to be
working full-time at full earning capacity already.'" Women, on
the other hand, must make a bigger adjustment insofar as they
more likely need to shift attention from in-home labor to market
labor.140 It is thus likely that men's anchors for all of these
relevant figures are higher than women's given their salary
advantage, their greater sense of entitlement, and the information
they have about others like them. These differential anchors
should benefit men in the divorce negotiation.
IV. Divorce Law: No More Alimony
Historically, marriage entitled a wife to lifetime support by
her husband, even if the couple divorced. 141 Given that a woman
was expected to eschew market labor in favor of home-making,
this arrangement made contractarian sense-if the woman was to
dedicate herself to her family, at the expense of investing in her
own earning capacity via education or work experience, she would
want to be assured of financial support even if her husband left

137. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS & BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ANNUAL
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY (2004), available at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032005/
perinc/new02_050.htm.
138. Serge Desmarais & James Curtis, Gender and Perceived Pay Entitlement:
Testing for Effects of Experience with Income, 72 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
141, 147 (1994).
139. Id. at 141 ("Men are more likely to draw comparisons with other men who
they understand to receive better pay.").
140. See Phillip Cohen & Suzanne Bianchi, Marriage, Children, and Women's
Employment: What Do We Know?, 122 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1999, at 22, 27-30
(citing 1998 statistics that 46.1% of married women and 34.7% of married mothers
with young children worked full time, and arguing that "women have reached the
point where marriage in itself has relatively little effect on their labor supply,
although access to other income, which, for married women, is primarily earnings
from their spouse, continues to exert a downward pressure on women's allocation of
time to paid work").
141. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31,
41 (2006) ("[S]tates' laws have historically treated marital obligations of support
(usually a husband's duty to support his wife) as enduring.").
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her.142 More recently, as we have discussed to some extent, the
law has shifted its focus from family values to individual
autonomy.143 Under the UMDA, spousal support is granted only
as a result of financial hardship, and the more common remedy is
rehabilitative alimony 144 Rehabilitative alimony is a short-term
obligation intended to help the wife get on her feet, through job
training or education, so that she can support herself.145 The goal
of the current law is to separate the spouses financially,
terminating their financial relationship at the same time they are
terminating their emotional and legal relationship.146
The movement away from long-term spousal support has
enormous financial implications for women, which we will only
briefly review here. Because most married women do not work at
full earning capacity, 1" usually due to household and family care
responsibilities, 148 at divorce they are at a significant
disadvantage in the labor market.149 Furthermore, as long as
women are more likely than men to have custody of children 150
(and, even with joint custody arrangements, more likely to be
providing for the day-to-day care of the children 1' 1), they are at a
further disadvantage in the labor market because their work
schedules are constrained by their child care obligations.152

142. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family
Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 721-23 (1993) (noting that previous rules protected
spouses who committed themselves to family care rather than to employment).
143. See id. at 723.
144. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT§ 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 446 (1998).
145. See 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce § 853 (1998) ("The concept of rehabilitative
alimony is based on the premise that the divorced spouse has a potential for selfsupport that needs development.").
146. See id. ("An award of rehabilitative alimony is also designed to permit
former spouses to develop their own lives free from obligations to each other.").
This is not, of course, possible in the case of child support.
147. See Cohen & Bianchi, supra note 140, at 30.
148. See Glenna Spitze & Karen Loscocco, Women's Position in the Household, 39
Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 647, 648 (1999) (arguing that women's market labor supgly is
constrained by their disproportionate share of household labor).
149. Matthew McKeever & Nicholas H. Wolfinger, Reexamining the Costs of
Marital Disruption for Women, 82 Soc. SCI. Q. 202, 215 (2001) (finding that,
although the costs of divorce have lessened as a result of married women's
increased participation in the labor market, women still fare worse than men after
divorce because their work is not as lucrative).
150. See Judith Seltzer, Consequences of Marital Disruption for Children, 20
ANN. REV. Soc. 235, 240--41 (1994) (noting that mothers often have primary
responsibility for children after divorce).
151. See generally id. at 242 (citing the most common form of joint custody to be
when children spend the majority of their time with their mother).
152. Many commentators question the adequacy of the child support awards
assisting women with these obligations. See, e.g., Mark Lino, Do Child Support
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Initiation of Negotiation
There are also reasons to believe that the new arrangement
is disadvantageous for women at the bargaining table. Linda
Babcock's book, Women Don't Ask, reveals the tendency for women
to eschew negotiating for things for themselves. 153 A series of
studies by Deborah Small, Michele Gelfand, Linda Babcock, and
Hilary Gettman showed that women were much less likely than
men to negotiate for themselves, even when they were cued that
negotiating was acceptable.154 In one task, participants were told
that they would be paid between three and ten dollars for playing
a 'word game as part of a study. 155 At the end of the session,
experimenters offered the participants three dollars and asked:
"Is that OK?" Few participants requested more money, but all but
one of those who did were men. 156 Typical negotiation tasks
explicitly inform participants they are in a negotiation and
examine the targets, tactics, and outcomes of the negotiation; in
contrast, this task was unique in that it examined if and when
people negotiate when the negotiation is not prescribed. 157
In another condition, participants were offered three dollars
and explicitly informed that they could negotiate for more
money. 158 Here, many men asked for (and all who asked, received)
the full ten dollars. Still, very few women opted to negotiate.'"
Finally, in the third condition, participants were offered three
dollars and told that they could ask for a higher payment. 160 At
A.

last, gender differences disappeared; as many women as men
asked for, and received, the higher payment.'6 1
Why did women respond to the cue to ask, but not the cue to
Awards Cover the Cost of Raising Children?, 11 FAM:. ECON. & NUTRITION REV. 29
(1998) (arguing that child support levels are inadequate due to both underpayment
by non-custodial spouses and insufficient awards from courts).
153. BABCOCK & LAsCHEVER, supra note 12, at 2-4 (citing studies "which
suggest that men are asking for things they want and initiating negotiations much
more often than women").
154. Deborah Small et al., VVho Goes to the Bargaining Table: Understanding
Gender Variation in the Initiation of Negotiation, 93 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 600, 600-13 (2007).
155. Id. at 603-04.
156. ld. (reporting that 23% of the men studied asked for more money without
receiving a cue).
157. Id. at 604.
158. Id. at 604-05.
159. Id. at 605 (finding that 17% of women and 59% of men negotiated for a
higher payment). In the control portion of this condition, where no cue to negotiate
was given, no women asked for more money. Id.
160. I d. at 607.
161. ld. (finding that 73% of women and 69% of men asked for more money).
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negotiate? The authors argued-and found evidence-that the
prospect of "negotiating'' evokes negative thoughts and feelings in
women more so than men, but asking does not.I62 They further
suggested (and offered empirical evidence in support of their
contention) that the crucial difference between asking and
negotiating has to do with power.163 Asking is something people in
low-status positions do:
children ask for an allowance, for
example. Asking is polite. Negotiations, on the other hand, tend
to be the province of the powerful: political figures, lawyers, and
business leaders negotiate with one another. Survey studies have
shown that women rate negotiating as being as enjoyable as trips
to the dentist, whereas men actually find negotiating to be kind of
fun.I64

B. Judgment Calls: Alimony us. Property Division
The alimony laws may have also helped to reduce the
indeterminacy in divorce negotiations simply by providing a metric
of negotiating success that is easy to understand. Most people can
figure out how much money they need to make in a month or even
in a year in order to get by or live normally. Thus, a wife who
needs a total of $3,000 per month in order to maintain a modest
lifestyle, and who makes $2,000 per month at her job, knows she
needs an additional $1,000 in alimony. In essence, because the
monthly requirement is concrete and may be obvious, it may
provide a more useful anchor than the anchors available in
property division negotiations. Her calculations help her to set a
reserve and target price. In property-division negotiations, it is
more difficult to define a successful negotiation.
Implications and Conclusions
It is beyond the scope of this essay-and beyond the reach of
the evidence we have cited-to draw bold policy conclusions based
on gender differences in negotiating style and tactics. There are
good normative arguments against alimony or judicial scrutiny of
separation agreements, whatever we may report on the empirical
data regarding women in bargaining situations. Nonetheless, this
is important research for legal scholars and policymakers alike.
Empirical research can help us evaluate the extent to which the
current system is justified given its goals, and, where it is not,

162. ld. at 610.
163. ld. at 608-10.
164. See, e.g., BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 12, at 114.

132

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 26:109

behavioral research like this may suggest why the system is not
meeting its goals.
We might assume, for example, that
indeterminate rules leave the parties less constrained in their
private negotiations and thus better able to maximize their joint
welfare. But if the empirical data suggests that the parties are not
maximizing joint welfare or that there is a systematic imbalance
between them (and it does), we might question the value of
indeterminate rules and their utility for the normative model.
We are not the first legal scholars to focus on the importance
of the default rule. Divorce laws are essentially default rules that
couples are permitted to contract around, with special latitude for
contracts made before the marriage (as opposed to contracts
negotiated at the time of divorce). The reason Donald Trump
obtains prenuptial agreements is so that he need not comply with
the rules of equal or equitable distribution in his state. The
default is psychologically important, and today, the no-spousalsupport default rule is increasingly difficult to contract around.
Oren Bar Gill and Chaim Fershtman have suggested that contract
law in particular instantiates a kind of learning process by which
people internalize the rules by interacting with them.' 65 When,
for example, the law shifts its focus away from alimony and
toward individual autonomy, people are more likely to think that
this is not simply true in a positivist sense but also right in a
moral or political sense. Thus, the default rule has importance for
its expressive content and for its effects on people's learning about
the legal system.
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein have suggested that
behavioral research can have normative implications without
being paternalistic in the traditional sense of the concept. 166 Their
"libertarian paternalism" is essentially the idea that we can use
behavioral research to inform our formulation of the default rule,
leaving parties free to make their own choices but, should they opt
to simply follow the norm, subject to a kind of wealth-maximizing
default rule. In the realm of divorce laws, it would be a useful
exercise to evaluate the effects of the current default rules, and to
question how they distribute goods between the parties and, more
broadly, among different groups in American society.

165. Oren Bar Gill & Chaim Fershtman, Law and Preferences, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 331 (2004).
166. Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 175, 177 (2003) (arguing that an employer who runs an "opt out" 401K plan is
acting paternalistically but is not interfering with employee preferences).

